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May 27, 2003
The Hog That Saves the Grunts
By Robert Coram
New York Times [Op-Ed]
ATLANTA - The Air Force is planning to give the A-10 Warthog
an ignominious homecoming from the Persian Gulf.
In early April, Maj. Gen. David Deptula of the Air Combat
Command ordered a subordinate to draft a memo justifying
the decommissioning of the A-10 fleet. The remaining eight
active duty A-10 squadrons (in 1991, the number was 18)
could be mothballed as early as 2004.
This is a serious mistake. The A-10 was one of the most
effective, lethal and feared weapons of the Iraqi war. Its
absence will put troops on the battlefield in grave danger.
The decision to take this aircraft out of service is the
result of entrenched political and cultural shortsightedness.
About the same time that the general's order was issued,
a crucial battle of the Iraqi war was unfolding. The United
States Army had arrived at a Tigris River bridge on the
edge of Baghdad to find Iraqi tanks and armored personnel
carriers positioned at the other end. A deadly crossfire
ensued. A call for help went out, and despite heavy clouds
and fog, down the river came two A-10's at an altitude of
less than 1,000 feet, spitting out a mix of armor-piercing
and explosive bullets at the rate of 3,900 rounds per minute.
The Iraqi resistance was obliterated. This was a classic
case of "close air support."
The A-10 was also the most storied aircraft of the first
gulf war. It flew so many sorties the Air Force lost count.
The glamorous F-117 Stealth fighter got the headlines, but
Iraqi prisoners interrogated after the war said the aircraft
they feared most were the A-10 and the ancient B-52 bomber.
To understand why the corporate Air Force so deeply loathes
the A-10, one must go back to 1947, when the Air Force broke
away from the Army and became an independent branch. "Strategic
bombing," which calls for deep bombing raids against enemy
factories and transportation systems, was the foundation
of the new service branch. But that concept is fundamentally
flawed for the simple reason that air power alone has never
won a war.
Nevertheless, strategic bombing, now known as "interdiction
bombing," remains the philosophical backbone of the Air
Force. Anything involving air support of ground troops is
a bitter reminder that the Air Force used to be part of
the Army and subordinate to Army commanders. For the white-scarf
crowd, nothing is more humiliating than being told that
what it does best is support ground troops.
Until the A-10 was built in the 1970's, the Air Force used
old, underpowered aircraft to provide close air support.
It never had a plane specifically designed to fly low to
the ground to support field troops. In fact, the A-10 never
would have been built had not the Air Force believed the
Army was trying to steal its close air support role - and
thus millions of dollars from its budget - by building the
Cheyenne helicopter. The Air Force had to build something
cheaper than the Cheyenne. And because the Air Force detested
the idea of a designated close air support aircraft, generals
steered clear of the project, and designers, free from meddling
senior officers, created the ultimate ground-support airplane.
It is cheap, slow, low-tech, does not have an afterburner,
and is so ugly that the grandiose name "Thunderbolt" was
forgotten in favor of "Warthog" or, simply, "the Hog." What
the airplane does have is a deadly 30-millimeter cannon,
two engines mounted high and widely separated to offer greater
protection, a titanium "bathtub" to protect the pilot, a
bullet- and fragmentation-resistant canopy, three back-up
flight controls, a heavy duty frame and foam-filled fuel
tanks - a set of features that makes it one of the safest
yet most dangerous weapons on the battlefield.
However, these attributes have long been ignored, even denied,
because of the philosophical aversion to the close air support
mission. Couple that with the Air Force's love affair with
the high technology F/A-22 ($252 million per plane) and
the F-35 fighter jets (early cost estimates are around $40
million each), and something's got to give.
Despite budget problems, the Air Force has decided to save
money by getting rid of the cheap plane and keeping the
expensive ones. Sacrifices must be made, and what a gleeful
one this will be for the Air Force.
The Air Force is promoting the F-35 on the idea that it
can provide close air support, a statement that most pilots
find hilarious. But the F-35's price tag means the Air Force
will not jeopardize the aircraft by sending it low where
an enemy with an AK-47 can bring it down. (Yes, the aircraft
will be that vulnerable.)
In the meantime, the Air Force is doing its utmost to get
the public to think of the sleek F-16 fighter jet as today's
close support aircraft. But in the 1991 gulf war and in
Kosovo, the Air Force wouldn't allow the F-16 to fly below
10,000 feet because of its vulnerability to attack from
anti-aircraft guns and missiles.
Grunts are comforted by the presence of a Hog, because when
they need close air support, they need it quickly. And the
A-10 can loiter over a battlefield and pounce at a moment's
notice. It is the only aircraft with pilots trained to use
their eyes to separate bad guys from good guys, and it can
use its guns as close in as 110 yards. It is the only aircraft
that can take serious hits from ground fire, and still take
its pilot home.
But the main difference between those who fly pointy-nose
aircraft and Hog drivers is the pilot's state of mind. The
blue suits in the Air Force are high-altitude advocates
of air power, and they aren't thinking about muddy boots.
A-10 drivers train with the Army. They know how the Army
works and what it needs. (In combat, an A-10 pilot is assigned
to Army units.)
If the Air Force succeeds in killing the A-10, it will leave
a serious gap in America's war-fighting abilities. By itself,
air power can't bring about victory. The fate of nations
and the course of history is decided by ground troops. The
A-10 is the single Air Force aircraft designed to support
those troops. For that reason alone, the Air Force should
keep the A-10 and build new close support aircraft similar
to the Hog, demonstrating its long-term commitment to supporting
our men and women in the mud.
Robert Coram is author of "Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed
the Art of War."
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